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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
any doubt that the statute was unconstitutional. The Court upheld the statute
feeling that the landlord had done no more than raise a conflict of testimony and
opinion as to the continuance of the emergency and he had failed to carry his
burden of proof. The Court held that where, in looking at the basis of statutes
which were enacted under particular conditions, questions of what the facts
elicited tend to establish is a debatable one, the Court will accept the legislative
determination and will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature as
long as the Court can discover any state of facts either known or reasonably
assumed, which support the legislation. Questions of wisdom, reasonableness and
propriety are for the legislature and not for the courts.
24
It is impossible from this decision to determine that the Court has retreated
from the stand which it took in Defiance Milk25 against economic restrictions.
There the Court felt that the Attorney General had to show some basis for the
statute whereas in the instant case it was not necessary for the Attorney General
to do so for the evidence adduced in opposition to the legislation itself showed
that there was some basis for an enactment of this type. This case appears to follow
the general police power principles which the Court has long followed and adds
little to the concept of the weight which is to be given to legislative determina-
tions.
Licensing of Electricians
It has long been generally recognized that all property is held subject to the
general police power of the state to regulate and control its use to secure the
general safety and the public welfare.26 The right of an individual to adopt and
follow such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he
may see fit, subject to such restrains as are necessary for the common welfare,
has never been denied.2 7 A license to engage in a traditionally lawful business
is a property right, protected by due process. 28 But a license in a potentially
harmful or nuisance-type activity is a mere privilege,- which does not constitu-
tionally even require notice and hearing before revocation.30
Licensing statutes are usually classified in two ways: (1) according to the
24. South Oarolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177
(1938).
25. Defiance Milk Products Co. v. DuMond, 309 N. Y. 537, 132 N. E. 2d
829 (1956), 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 42 (1956).
26. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
27. Slaughter House Case, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Matter of Jacobs,
98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636 (1885).
28. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U. S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1873); Bender v. Board
of Regents, 262 App. Div. 627, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 779 (3d Dep't 1941).
29. Lodes v..Dept; of Health, 189 N. Y. 187, 87 N. E. 187 (1907).
30. Matter of Yates t. Mulrooney, 245 App. Div. 146, 281 N. Y. Supp. 218
(4th Dep't 1935).
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trades licensed and (2) by the method of licensing used. In most states licenses
are regulated by either a statewide administrative agency or by a municipal
ordinance pursuant to statutory authority and administered by a special agency
or by an already established branch of the municipal government.3 ' The most
frequently regulated occupations are those of plumber and electrician3 2 Plumbing
statutes are generally held constitutionally valid because plumbing and drainage
vitally affect the health and safety of city dwellers.33 Similarly, electricians' licens-
ing statutes are upheld on the ground that they are closely related to fire preven-
tion.3 4
Where a board is created to examine applicants for licenses, the statutes
setting up the boards generally make it unlawful for any person to engage in
business without first obtaining a certificate of competency. This latter require-
ment has withstood a challenge to its constitutionality as reasonably calculated to
protect the public health.35 Statutes prohibiting the installation or repair by any-
one but a licensed master have also been upheld.36
In a recent decision,37 the Court of Appeals went one step' further in per-
mitting the City of New York, under the authority of a provision in its adminis-
trative code, to require that one licensed as a master electrician be principally
engaged in such work and to provide that if he is engaged in any other business
his license may be revoked. Since the master electrician is the one on whom the
full responsibility falls for all the work done, there is a basis for requiring that
all persons licensed as a master be not principally engaged in any other business.
This is only a reasonable regulation designed to give residents the proper pro-
tection from fire hazards inherent in a crowded metropolis and the Court held it
reasonably tends toward that end which is a legitimate object of the police power,
the public welfare.
The dissent felt that the requirement bore no relation to the public welfare
and was merely a means whereby business competitors limited competition.
The reasoning of the majority appears sound since it cannot be doubted that
requiring a man to be principally engaged in an occupation will ensure greater
skill on his part and afford greater protection to the public.
31. Clark, Occupational Licensing in the Building Industry, 1952 WASir.
U. L. Q. 483 (1952).
32. Clark, supra note 31, at 485.
33. People v. Harford, 286 N. Y. 477, 36 N. E. 2d 670 (1941).
34. City of Tucson v. Stewart, 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P. 72 (1935); Richardson
.v. Coker, 78 Ga. 170, 3 S. E. 2d 636 (1939); Berry 'v. Chicago, 320 I1. 536, 151
N. E, 581 (1926).
35. People ex rel. Nechamus v. Warden, 144 N. Y. 529, 39 N. E. 686 (1895).
36. People v. Harford, 286 N. Y. 477, 36 N. E. 2d 670 (1941).
37. Spielvogel v. Ford, 1 N. Y. 2d 558, 136 N. E. 2d 586 (1956).
